This appeal presents the novel issue in this circuit of when and how a child support enforcement agency may lawfully obtain the consumer credit report of an individual who has fallen behind in paying court-ordered child support. Plaintiff-appellant Saleh Hasbun, a father owing his ex-wife more than $62,000 in child support, argues that the County of Los Angeles obtained his consumer credit report in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and hold that child support enforcement agencies need not comply with the certification requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(4) when seeking to collect court-ordered child support.

* After Hasbun and his wife divorced in 1985, the Los Angeles County Superior Court ordered Hasbun to pay his ex-wife support for their then 10-year-old son. Hasbun made few — if any — child support payments from 1985 to 1997. In 1997, the Los Angeles County Superior Court ordered and adjudged that Hasbun was in arrears to his ex-wife in the amount of $62,179.82.

Seeking to enforce the 1997 judgment, in May 2001 the Los Angeles County District Attorney's division known as the Bureau of Family Support Operations (BFSO) requested a copy of Hasbun's consumer credit report from Experian, a credit reporting agency. After receiving notice that the BFSO had accessed his consumer report, Hasbun brought the present action.

According to Hasbun, the BFSO impermissibly obtained his consumer credit report in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. In particular, Hasbun argues that the BFSO failed to comply with the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(4). The County of Los Angeles and Experian ("defendants") agree that the certification requirements of § 1681b(a)(4) were not satisfied. But this is of no consequence, defendants maintain, because § 1681b(a)(4) is inapplicable to a child support agency seeking to collect a court-ordered child support debt.

The district court held that § 1681b(a)(4) did not apply to the present case and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. We agree and affirm.

In general, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b enumerates the "permissible purposes" for which a credit reporting agency, such as Experian, may furnish a consumer credit report. Resolution of this case ultimately hinges on which subsection of 1681b applies to defendants: § 1681b(a)(4) or § 1681b(a)(3)(A).1 We hold that § 1681b(a)(3)(A) — and not § 1681b(a)(4) — applies to child support enforcement agencies attempting to collect a court-ordered judgment of child support.

* Under § 1681b(a)(3)(A), Experian was permitted to release Hasbun's consumer credit report to the BFSO if the BFSO requested the report "in connection with ... [the] collection of an account" of Hasbun. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A). "Collection of an account" is nowhere defined in the statute, and the legislative history is not enlightening. But the limited case law addressing this issue has uniformly held that creditors have a permissible purpose in receiving a consumer report to assist them in collecting a debt. In other words, collection of a debt is considered to be the "collection of an account." See Duncan v. Handmaker, 149 F.3d 424, 428 (6th Cir.1998); Edge v. Professional Claims Bureau, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118 (E.D.N.Y.1999); Korotki v. Attorney Serv. Corp., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1269, 1277 (D.Md.1996).

Like other creditors, judgment creditors may utilize § 1681b(a)(3)(A) to access consumer reports. We think the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) commentary is persuasive:

A judgment creditor has a permissible purpose to receive a consumer report on the judgment debtor for use in connection with collection of the judgment debt, because it is in the same position as any creditor attempting to collect a debt from a consumer who is the subject of a consumer report.

16 C.F.R. Pt. 600, App. at 509 (2002).

Government officials seeking to enforce a judgment of child support also have a permissible purpose to access the consumer credit report of the judgment debtor. Again, the FTC's commentary is helpful:

A district attorney's office or other child support agency may obtain a consumer report in connection with enforcement of the report subject's child support obligation, established by court (or quasijudicial administrative) orders, since the agency is acting as or on behalf of the judgment creditor, and is, in effect, collecting a debt.

16 C.F.R. Pt. 600, App. at 509 (2002) (emphasis added).2

At least one court has expressly adopted the FTC's position and held that collection of a child support judgment "constitutes a `collection of an account' under 1681b(3)(A)."3 Baker v. Bronx-Westchester Investigations, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 260, 262-63 (S.D.N.Y.1994). We likewise adopt the position of the FTC. A child support enforcement agency, when seeking to enforce a final order of child support, has a permissible purpose to request a consumer credit report because collecting court ordered child support is the "collection of an account" under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A). Consequently, the BFSO had a permissible purpose under subsection (a)(3)(A) to request Hasbun's consumer credit report. Defendants did not violate the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

The 1996 amendment to 15 U.S.C. § 1681b, which added subsection (a)(4), does not alter our holding.4 Hasbun argues that under the plain language of subsection (a)(4), a child support enforcement agency must, in all circumstances, jump through the certification hoops of subsection (a)(4)(A)-(D). See supra note 1. We think Hasbun reads subsection (a)(4) too broadly.

By its terms, subsection (a)(4) only applies to child support enforcement agencies having "the purpose of establishing an individual's capacity to make child support payments or determining the appropriate level of such payment." 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added). On its face, the subsection does not apply to credit report requests for the purpose of collecting unpaid child support.5

The practical effect of the 1996 amendment adding subsection (a)(4) was to expand the permissible purposes for which a child support enforcement agency could obtain a consumer report. Similar to assessing a litigation adversary's ability to satisfy a judgment before one was obtained, determining a person's capacity to make child support payments was probably not a permissible purpose for obtaining a consumer credit report prior to the 1996 amendment. See Mone v. Dranow, 945 F.2d 306, 308 (9th Cir.1991) (acquiring a credit report for the purpose of learning whether the potential defendant could satisfy a judgment was not a permissible purpose under the statute); see also Duncan, 149 F.3d at 427 ("While a lawsuit occasionally may give rise to a `legitimate business need' for a consumer report ... trial preparation generally does not fall within the scope of § 1681b."). Thus, subsection (a)(4) broadens, not limits, the power of child support enforcement agencies to obtain consumer credit reports.6

Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, a child support enforcement agency may obtain the consumer credit report of a person owing or potentially owing child support. When requesting a consumer credit report to establish an individual's capacity to pay support or to determine the appropriate amount of payment, the child support enforcement agency must comply with the certification requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(4). But when, as in this case, the agency seeks to enforce an already existing order of child support, the certification requirements of § 1681b(a)(4) are inapplicable.

Here, the BFSO properly obtained Hasbun's consumer credit report to enforce an existing order of child support. In so doing, the BFSO was engaged in the "collection of an account" under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(A) and therefore had a permissible purpose for obtaining it. The law requires no more.